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Abstract
Background: There is limited knowledge about the potential routes for H5N1 influenza virus transmission to and
between humans, and it is not clear whether humans can be infected through inhalation of aerosolized H5N1 virus
particles. Ferrets are often used as a animal model for humans in influenza pathogenicity and transmissibility
studies. In this manuscript, a nose-only bioaerosol inhalation exposure system that was recently developed and
validated was used in an inhalation exposure study of aerosolized A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (H5N1) virus in ferrets. The
clinical spectrum of influenza resulting from exposure to A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (H5N1) through intranasal verses
inhalation routes was analyzed.
Results: Ferrets were successfully infected through intranasal instillation or through inhalation of small particle
aerosols with four different doses of Influenza virus A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (H5N1). The animals developed severe
influenza encephalomyelitis following intranasal or inhalation exposure to 10
1,1 0
2,1 0
3,o r1 0
4 infectious virus
particles per ferret.
Conclusions: Aerosolized Influenza virus A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (H5N1) is highly infectious and lethal in ferrets.
Clinical signs appeared earlier in animals infected through inhalation of aerosolized virus compared to those
infected through intranasal instillation.
Background
Human infections caused by H5N1 highly pathogenic
avian influenza viruses (H5N1) that arose from 2003-
onwards have been rare as evident by only 500 cases con-
firmed through 5 July, 2010. However, H5N1 have a fatal-
ity rate of about 59% [1]. In ferret transmission models,
the H5N1 viruses were inconsistent in transmission by
direct or indirect contact exposure including respiratory
droplets, but direct intranasal exposure caused morbidity
and sometimes, mortality [2,3]. In contrast, the 1918
pandemic influenza virus was easily transmissible, espe-
cially human-to-human, and caused the deaths of
between 20 - 40 million people worldwide for a lethality
rate of 2.5%, and experimental studies demonstrated effi-
cient transmission ferret-to-ferret by respiratory droplets
[4]. The differences in transmissibility and lethality
between the two viruses is not fully understood, but the
use of aerosol challenge may improve our understanding
of factors responsible for transmission and lethality of
the H5N1 viruses.
There is limited knowledge about the potential routes
and determinants required for H5N1 influenza virus
transmission to and between humans, and it is not clear
whether humans can be infected through inhalation of
aerosolized contemporary H5N1 virus particles. Recep-
tor distribution in the human airway is proposed to
restrict efficient inter-human transmission of H5N1
influenza virus [5]. Human influenza viruses specifically
recognize a2,6-linked sialic acid (SA) receptors, which
are dominant on epithelial cells in the upper respiratory
tract [5]. In contrast, avian influenza viruses specifically
recognize a2,3-linked SA receptors, which are located in
the lower respiratory tract [5,6] and are not easily
reached by the large droplets (diameter of > 10 μm)
produced by coughing or sneezing [7]. As reviewed by
Tellier [8], various publications state that large-droplet
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tion by seasonal influenza A viruses is acquired by
humans [7,9,10]. However, others refer to aerosols as an
important mode of transmission for influenza [11-15]. It
is also possible that transmission occurs through direct
contact with secretions or fomites with oral, conjuncti-
val and nasal mucus membranes because the virus can
remain infectious on nonporous dry surfaces for up to
48 hours [16]. Since human infections with 2003 to pre-
sent year H5N1 influenza viruses has been associated
with high death rates and because healthcare workers
cannot as yet be protected by vaccination, it is impor-
tant to understand how the viruses can be transmitted
to humans.
To date, transmission of H5N1 viruses to humans has
been inefficient, occurred primarily through close con-
tact with infected birds or, in a single case, consumption
of raw infected duck blood [17]. Transmission of seaso-
nal influenza A viruses by large droplets without accom-
panying aerosols has been simulated by intranasal
droplet infection [18]. It is assumed that H5N1 infec-
tions may be acquired through droplet transmission
routes, since intranasal inoculation of ferrets with H5N1
strains (used as a model for droplet infection) can result
in clinical signs of severe influenza [3,19-22]. Whereas
there is some evidence for limited human-to-human
transmission of H5N1 [17,23-26], and the ferret model
used as a surrogate for droplet infection suggests H5N1
infections can occur through droplets, it is still unclear
whether droplet infection is the primary route of H5N1
transmission in humans. Because some of the circulating
H5N1 avian viruses have demonstrated uncharacteristic
affinity for a2,6-linked SA receptors and are therefore
potentially dangerous to humans [27,28], it is important
to evaluate their transmissibility in a suitable animal
model. Domesticated ferrets (Mustela putorius furo)
have been shown to be an appropriate animal model
[29] for study of the pathogenicity [19,21] and transmis-
sibility [30,31] of influenza viruses. On the basis of
H5N1 virus cell tropism in their lower respiratory tract,
ferrets have also been proposed to be a good small-ani-
mal model of human H5N1 pneumonia [6]. Since 1997,
highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses have evolved into mul-
tiple genetic clades and differ in their pathogenicity to
mammalian species [19,21,32-34]. For example, some
H5N1 viruses spread systemically to multiple organs of
inoculated ferrets [19,21,32].
We hypothesized that clinically apparent infections
can arise from inhalation of aerosolized H5N1 viruses,
and tested our hypothesis using inhalation exposure stu-
dies of aerosolized H5N1 in a ferret model. In this
report, aerosols are defined as suspensions in air of
small solid or liquid particles that remain airborne for
prolonged periods of times due to their low settling
velocity. Since particles ≥ 6 μm are increasingly trapped
in the upper respiratory tract [35], the size cut-off of
≤ 5 μm used by many authors is also used here in refer-
ence to aerosols. Three available relatively recent H5N1s
isolated from humans or animals from 2004 to 2006
that caused low to high pathogenicity in their original
hosts (Table 1) were chosen for an initial assessment of
pathogenicity in ferrets. Ferrets were intranasally
instilled with the H5N1s. Of the three H5N1s, one was
judged more virulent than the others and was aeroso-
lized using a nose-only bioaerosol inhalation exposure
system (NBIES) that we recently described and validated
[36]. We report that as for intranasal instillation, inhala-
tion of small aerosol particles of that H5N1 virus strain
causes severe influenza encephalomyelitis and a lethal
outcome.
Results
1. Pathogenicity of the H5N1 viruses in ferrets following
intranasal inoculation
The pathogenicity of the three viruses differed in ferrets
following droplet deposition directly into nasal cavities.
Each virus was infectious at each of the intranasal (IN)
doses (10
1 to 10
4 TCID50/ferret). A/Vietnam/1203/2004
(VN/04) caused neurological signs, temperature eleva-
tion, and weight loss (up to 21.6%) (Table 2), as pre-
viously reported [19-21]. In contrast, whereas ferrets
inoculated with A/Mongolia/244/2005 (MO/05) and
A/Iraq/207-NAMRU3/2006 (IQ/06) viruses developed
fever, they did not develop neurological signs, and over-
all had lower weight losses (up to 15.6%) (Table 2).
Neither MO/05 nor IQ/06 caused lethal infections and
none of the animals infected by those viruses had to be
euthanized for humanitarian reasons (Table 2). Viruses
MO/05 and VN/04 were isolated from both nasal wash
and rectal swab specimens at days 3 and 5 p.i., while
IQ/06 was isolated from nasal washes but not from rec-
tal swab specimens. The viruses isolated in Mv1 Lu cells
from nasal washes and rectal swab specimens (Table 2)
formed cytopathic effects typical for influenza viruses
a n dw e r ec o n f i r m e da si n f l u e n z aAv i r u s e sb yf i r s t
screening with commercial solid phase ELISA test
(QuickVue Influenza A and B kit, Materials and Meth-
ods) followed by RT-PCR and sequencing of representa-
tive samples. Taken together, pathogenicity following
intranasal inoculation was judged, as greatest to least
pathogenic, as: VN/04 > MO/05 > IQ/06. From these
results, VN/04 was the most virulent and chosen for
aerosol studies.
2. Virus stability in aerosol vehicle
The stability of VN/04 in aerosol vehicle (PBS + 0.5%
w/v BSA fraction V) was confirmed. After one hour at
room temperature, no loss of titer was detected in the
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shown).
3. Inhalation exposure of ferrets to VN/04
An improved NBIES system, slightly modified from the
original version [36] by the addition of an additional
pump attached to the sampling system (Figure 1), func-
tioned as designed without mechanical failures or per-
turbations of aerosol stream. Ferret holders (prototypes
built for this project, Figure 2), were designed to accom-
modate 3-month old female ferrets. No problems were
detected during inhalation exposure; the animals’ faces/
heads did not change color (no cyanosis or reddening of
face or ears), suggesting proper oxygen intake, and other
signs of stress were not observed. Previous tests verified
that heat transfer from ferret body out of the restraint
tubes was efficient; neither heat stress nor elevated body
temperature was detected during inhalation exposure
studies. Upon release from the restraint tubes, the
animals resumed normal behavior without incident.
Measurements of the mean mass aerodynamic dia-
meter (MMAD) of the aerosol stream during the expo-
sure period (10 min) were taken at 30 sec intervals
using the APS. The results for all doses are summarized
as an aerosol particle size log-probability plot (Figure 3).
A ss h o w n ,t h eM M A Dr a n g e df r o m3 . 4 3-3 . 5μmw i t h
geometric standard deviations (GSD) of 1.94 - 2.0 over
4 dose ranges. For aerosol vehicle (PBS + BSA) alone,
the values were: MMAD of 3.53 μm, GSD = 2.
4. Clinical observations and pathogenicity of VN/04 in
ferrets following aerosol exposure
The results of exposure to aerosolized VN/04 are sum-
marized in Table 3. As typical for the range-finding
pilot experiments performed here, the numbers of ani-
mals that were used in this work are small [19-22] but
suggest that serious clinical signs occur sooner in ani-
mals exposed to aerosolized VN/04 than animals
infected by the same virus through IN instillation
(Table 4). Neurologic signs were also apparent in a
greater % of animals. Loose stools and shedding of the
lining of the large intestine were evident by day two p.i.
in the aerosol group, later in the IN group. Fever and
weight loss (up to -25.95%) were similar to those
observed for the IN group infected with VN/04. In con-
trast, the negative control group that inhaled only aero-
sol vehicle plus antifoam agent (but no virus) remained
clinically normal and achieved a normal weight gain
during the course of the observation period. This indi-
cated that neither inhalation of aerosol vehicle or anti-
foam B caused the morbidity and mortality in the
animals exposed to aerosolized VN/04.
Three organs (brain, heart, and lung) chosen for virus
titration were taken from three animals that received
presented doses of 10
2,1 0
3,o r1 0
4 TCID50 as aeroso-
lized infectious virus particles. Higher titers were
detected in brain than in lung tissues (Figure 4). Brain,
heart, kidneys, liver, lungs, and spleen were also col-
lected for histology and immunohistochemistry analyses
from two animals that received 10
1 and 10
4 TCID50 as
aerosolized infectious virus particles, from one animal
instilled with 10
1 TCID50 as infectious virus particles,
and one negative control animal from the aerosol and
IN groups. Brain lesions and H5N1 viral antigen were
found in ferrets exposed to virus by either aerosol or IN
routes. The animal exposed to 10
1 virus particles by
aerosol demonstrated evidence of systemic disease, with
lesions in liver and spleen tissues at 5 days p.i. In con-
trast, the animal that received the same dose by IN
route developed neurologic signs seven days later, but
did not have liver or spleen lesions 12 days p.i. Among
the three virus-infected animals for which pathology stu-
dies were performed, lung lesions were apparent only in
t h ea n i m a lt h a ti n h a l e dad o s eo f1 0
4 aerosolized virus
particles. Interestingly, gross examination revealed exter-
nal evidence of multilobar pneumonia only in the lungs
of ferrets receiving doses of 10
4 virus particles by aero-
sol or IN routes, consistent with histology and immuno-
histochemistry results. No lesions were present in the
negative control animals that were administered only
PBS (IN group) or PBS + antifoam agent (aerosol
group).
Table 1 Virus strains used in current study and previous data on ferret pathogenicity
Virus pathogenicity
H5N1 virus Virus acronym Clade
and subclade
a
Original host (reference) Ferrets (reference)
A/Vietnam/1203/2004 VN/04 1 High
b [21] High [19-21]
A/Mongolia/244/2005 MO/05 2.2 High
c [50] Moderate [20]
A/Iraq/207-NAMRU3/2006 IQ/06 2.2 Mild
d [39] Unknown
e
aBased on the phylogenetic analysis of the HA genes [34].
bFatal in 10-yr-old human male.
cIsolated from dead whooper swan.
dMild illness in 3-yr-old human male.
eNo known previously published data.
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Page 3 of 15Table 2 Outcomes of IN instillations of three different H5N1 influenza viruses in ferrets
Virus Dose
a
(TCID50
units/
ferret)
Clinical signs Inactivity
index
e
Neurologic signs and
related observations
Lethality
h Virus titer
i Isolation of
H5N1 from
rectal swab
specimens
on indicated
day
postinfection
Maximum
weight loss
b
(%)
Weight at
termination
c
(%)
Maximum T
increase
d
(°C)
Nasal
washes on
indicated
day
postinfection
day 3 day 5 day 3 day 5
VN/
04
4.9 × 101 -4.21 -3.71 1.5 2 None observed 12(t) 2 2 + +
4.9 × 10
1 -20.03 -20.03 1.6 4 Ataxia
f; shaking of
head
12(e) 1 - + +
4.9 × 10
1 NA +9.68 NA 2 None observed 12(t) - - - -
4.9 × 10
2 -2.36 -2.36 2.0 2 None observed 12(t) 2.9 3 + +
4.9 × 10
2 -9.18 -9.18 1.4 2 Ataxia 7(e) 1.9 3 + +
4.9 × 10
3 -0.78 +1.82 1.3 2 None observed 12(t) 1.9 1.5 + +
4.9 × 10
3 -3.85 +5.20 0.7 2 None observed 12(t) 2.9 1.9 + +
4.9 × 10
4 -21.64 -21.64 2.0 4 Ataxia; convulsions
g 5(e) 4 4 + +
4.9 × 10
4 -12.16 -12.16 3.0 2 Ataxia; convulsions 5(e) 4 3 + +
MO/
05
4.9 × 10
1 -1.23 -0.82 1.0 1 None observed Non-lethal 3.9 2.9 + +
4.9 × 10
1 -4.95 No change 2.3 1 None observed Non-lethal 6.9 5.9 ND
j +
4.9 × 10
1 -15.57 -10.75 2.4 2 None observed Non-lethal 3 3 + +
4.9 × 10
2 -3.99 +0.59 0.8 2 None observed Non-lethal 4 5.9 + +
4.9 × 10
2 -3.79 -2.01 1.4 1 None observed Non-lethal 4 4 + +
4.9 × 10
3 -5.64 -3.88 1.2 2 None observed Non-lethal 7 8 + +
4.9 × 10
3 -3.86 -2.45 1.1 2 None observed Non-lethal 4 3.9 + +
4.9 × 10
4 -13.58 -7.04 1.7 2 None observed Non-lethal 6 4.7 + ND
4.9 × 10
4 -12.85 -0.58 1.8 2 None observed Non-lethal 6 5 + +
IQ06 4.9 × 10
1 -7.28 +3.64 0.4 1 None observed Non-lethal 4 3 - -
4.9 × 10
1 -0.24 +2.87 1.6 1 None observed Non-lethal 1.9 1.9 - -
4.9 × 10
1 -0.59 +3.4 2.0 1 None observed Non-lethal 3 1.9 - -
4.9 × 10
2 -1.0 +3.39 1.0 2 None observed Non-lethal 1.9 1.9 - -
4.9 × 10
2 -2.85 -1.83 1.9 2 None observed Non-lethal 2 1.9 - -
4.9 × 10
3 -0.96 +0.24 1.9 2 None observed Non-lethal 2.9 5 - -
4.9 × 10
3 -1.2 -1.2 2.1 1 None observed Non-lethal 6 7 - ND
4.9 × 10
4 -5.4 -5.44 2.1 2 None observed Non-lethal 6 5 - -
4.9 × 10
4 -1.16 -1.05 1.8 2 None observed Non-lethal 6 6 - -
aBased on TCID50 in Mv1-Lu cells.
b,cCompared to body weight at day 0.
dCompared to baseline temperature.
eHighest inactivity index value in one observation prior to death or euthanasia.
fAtaxia; incoordination and unsteadiness.
gConvulsions; involuntary muscular contractions.
hLethality; Day ferret euthanized (e) for humanitarian reasons or terminated (t) at end of study
iValues for each animal are expressed as virus titers (log10 TCID50/mL) obtained using Mv1 Lu cells.
jND; Not determined due to destruction of the cellular monolayer by another virus.
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We determined that small particle aerosols of VN/04
were highly infectious in ferrets. As previously shown
for IN instillation, VN/04 was neurotropic when inhaled
as a small particle aerosol. At low inhaled doses (10
1 to
10
3 TCID50 units of VN/04/ferret), small particle aero-
sols of VN/04 can result in infection and resulting brain
lesions without accompanying lung lesions in ferrets. In
support of this notion, the titer of VN/04 in brain tis-
sues was higher than that detected in lung tissues in
animals that inhaled aerosolized virus. At a higher
inhaled dose (10
4 TCID50 units of VN/04/ferret), pneu-
monia also occurs. This small study suggests that clini-
cal disease appears earlier in ferrets exposed to VN/04
by aerosol versus IN routes, though severe disease
resulted from both routes of inoculation.
The MMAD measurements showed consistent particle
delivery (for all four dose groups) that centered on a
s i z er a n g et h a ts h o u l db er e s p i r e da n dd e p o s i t e di nt h e
lower respiratory tract of humans. There was little
difference in size to the MMAD of the control alone,
suggesting one virus particle was trapped in the salt-
BSA complex in the aerosols. There is no formal proof
Figure 1 Schematic representation of the NBIES. Components outside (left) and inside (right) the glovebox are demarcated.
Figure 2 Ferret holder. Shown are the ferret restraint tube with
integral connector cone (above) and push rod ["plunger"] (below).
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virus (the virus may have aerosolized as free virus parti-
cles), but development of lung lesions and detection of
virus in lung tissues prove delivery and deposition of
virus in the lungs. In addition, the presence of brain
lesions without lung lesions in the lower dose groups,
suggests deposition in posterior nasal cavity and direct
extension along olfactory nerves to the brain. Previously,
intranasal inoculation or feeding MO/05 infected
chicken meat to ferrets produced an upper respiratory
infection with local extension along olfactory nerves to
olfactory bulbs [20]. Similarly, intranasal inoculation
with VN/04 produced abundant viral antigen in olfac-
tory bulbs of ferrets [20].
The NBIES exposure port flow velocity (0.234 m/s) is
relatively low (~0.52 m/hr or ~ 0.84 km/hr); therefore
stress caused by airstream impaction on the animal’s
face is not an issue. Moreover, the actual volume of air
in front of the animals’ face (approx. 12.9 ml) is small
and changes frequently relatively to the volume deliv-
ered/min for each port (Qport); thus, rebreathing of
exhaled air and stalling of aerosolized viral particles
should not occur. The system flow rate Qsys of 5 L/min
surpasses the calculated Vm for 5 animals by a factor of
about 2.9× with a high estimate of 0.345 L/min for Vm,
and a factor of 5×; with a value of 0.2 L/min. The same
values apply to air changes; at 0.345 L/min, the number
of air changes required is 0.345 L/min × 5/0.101 L =
~17.1, since there are 49.4 changes/min, ~ 2.9 air
changes occur per breath, showing that adequate airflow
is generated. Adequate air flow is important for accurate
dose calculations as well as for the reduction of stress
Figure 3 Aerosol size log-probability plot for VN/04. The MMAD and GSD are indicated at four different concentrations of virus and for the
control solution.
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when air is re-breathed.
A striking finding in this pilot study with relatively few
animals is that infection acquired through inhalation
exposure results in more abrupt clinical signs and may
be associated with increased probability of developing
neurologic disease. Since pathology examinations were
performed on only three virus-infected animals, large
conclusions could not be drawn over the route of expo-
sure and pathogenesis. Some general conclusions
inferred from our histology/immunohistochemistry and
virology work are that: (a) histologic changes may not
be present even with high virus titer in particular
tissues, and (b) that brain lesions are possible without
lung lesions in H5N1 infections suggesting direct
extension of the virus from posterior nasal cavity
through olfactory nerves into the brain, in agreement
with a previous report [3]. These findings underscore
the need to perform pathology analyses in conjunction
with virology analyses to understand the course of
H5N1 disease.
The 50% infectious dose in ferrets (FID50)a n dt h e
FLD50 of VN/04 might be inferred but were not deter-
m i n e di nt h i sw o r k( s u c hat a s kr e q u i r e sm a n ym o r e
animals). However, it is clear that the number of infec-
tious VN/04 particles necessary to cause fatal infection
is ≤ 40. From this work, it is concluded that VN/04 is
highly infectious through airborne routes of infection.
The extent this occurs in natural infections with viruses
within the clade that includes VN/04 is unclear. Though
Table 3 Outcomes of exposure of ferrets to aerosolized VN/04
Presented
dose
a
(TCID50
units/ferret)
Ferret weight and temperature Inactivity
index
e
Neurologic signs and
related observations
Lethality
j Virus titer
k Isolation of
H5N1 from
anal swab
specimens
on indicated
day
postinfection
Max. wt.
loss
b (%)
Wt. at
term.
c (%)
Max. T
increase
d (°C)
Nasal
washes on
indicated
day
postinfection
day 3 day 5 day 3 day 5
3.2 × 10
1 -11.17 -11.17 1.7 2 None observed 12(e) 2 1 + +
-16.91 -16.91 0.6 4 Unresponsive (moribund) 5(e) 3 4 + +
-25.95 -25.95 1.9 4 Ataxia
f
Convulsions
g
Hyper-responsivness to tactile
stimulus
5(e) 2 4 + +
3.4 × 10
2 -20.56 -20.56 1.3 2 Ataxia
Convulsions
Aggression-dementia
h
4(e) 2 NA + NA
-8.44 -8.44 1.7 3 NA 3(d) NA NA NA NA
3.4 × 10
3 -22.59 -22.59 2.1 4 Ataxia;
Hind-limb paralysis;
Aggression-dementia
4(e) 3 NA + NA
-17.31 -17.31 1.6 3 Ataxia; Convulsions 4(e) 4 NA + NA
3.4 × 10
4 -17.21 -17.21 1.5 2 Ataxia; Convulsions
Head tilt
i
4(d) 4 NA + NA
-19.40 -19.40 2.0 3 Ataxia; Head tilt 4(e) 3 NA + NA
aBased on TCID50 in Mv1-Lu cells.
bMax. wt., Maximum weight compared to body weight at day 0.
cWt. at term., Weight at termination compared to body weight at day 0.
dCompared to baseline temperature.
eHighest inactivity index value in one observation prior to death or euthanasia.
fAtaxia; incoordination and unsteadiness.
gConvulsions; involuntary muscular contractions.
hAggression-dementia; excessively aggressive biting and snapping of jaws at shadows, inanimate objects including cage walls, and at caretakers.
iHead tilt (torticollis).
jDay ferret found dead (d) or day euthanized (e) for humanitarian reasons.
kValues expressed as log10 TCID50/mL of virus titers using Mv1 Lu cells.
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in the URT is low with contemporary H5N1s. Further-
more, sneezing, which primarily results in the formation
of droplets, was rarely observed in the infected animals.
Thus, droplet transmission may be lower than that
encountered with seasonal influenza viruses. It remains
unclear why ferret to ferret transmission is inefficient
with this virus; perhaps the virus is not present in signif-
icant quantities in aerosols that might accompany
sneezes or coughs. Current explanations for poor
person-to-person transmission vary. One line of reason-
ing is that H5N1s do not have viral polymerase genes
that function well in cells of the upper respiratory tract.
For example, Hatta et al. [37] found that mutation of
Table 4 Clinical and behavioral observations in virus-infected ferrets.
Sign/Observation Range of day(s) symptoms observed postinoculation with virus
a
WS/05
intranasal
IRAQ/06
intranasal
Viet/04
intranasal
Viet/04
aerosol
Death
b N/O
c N/O Days 5 - 12 Days 3 - 5
Soft stool/diarrhea N/O N/O Days 3 - 5 Days 2 - 5
Fever Days 2 - 7 Days 2 - 7 Days 2 - 9 Days 2 - 5
Inappetence Days 2 - 7 Days 4 - 7 Days 3 - 12 Days 2 - 5
Labored breathing
d/wheezing Days 4 - 6 N/O Day 5 Days 4 - 5
Lethargy Days 3 - 7 Days 4 - 5 Days 3 - 12 Days 1 - 5
Neurologic signs Aggression-dementia N/O N/O N/O Day 4
Ataxia N/O N/O Days 5 - 12 Days 4 - 5
Convulsions N/O N/O Day 5 Days 4 - 5
Head-tilt N/O N/O N/O Day 4
Hind-limb paralysis N/O N/O N/O Day 4
Shaking of head (only) N/O N/O Days 11- 12 N/O
Shaking (whole body) or shivering Days 5 - 6 N/O N/O Days 2 - 4
Sneezing Days 5 - 6 N/O N/O Day 2
Weight loss Days 1 - 7 Days 4 - 7 Days 2 - 12 Days 1 - 5
Resolution Day 8 onwards Day 8 onwards Uncertain N/O
Dehydration/Thin Day 7 N/O Days 5-12 Days 3-5
aTen-day observation period for MO/05 and IRAQ/06; twelve-day for Viet/04.
bAnimals found dead or euthanized for humanitarian reasons
cN/O; not observed.
dLabored breathing; animals exhibited open-mouth breathing with exaggerated abdominal movement.
Figure 4 Virus titers in brain, liver, and lung tissues taken from three animals.
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is a component of the viral polymerase complex)
resulted in efficient replication of the virus in upper
respiratory tract cells. Using a non-human primate
model (Chinese rhesus macaque), Chen et al.[ 3 8 ]
showed that pneumocytes and macrophages of the
lower airway, not the ciliary epithelium of the trachea
and bronchi, were the chief target cells in the lung tis-
sue. They conclude that “predilection of the H5N1 virus
to infect the lower airway suggests that the failure of the
virus to attach to the ciliary epithelium of the trachea
and bronchi may be a limiting factor in human-to-
human transmissibility of the H5N1 virus”.T a k e n
together, tropism for cells of the LRT tract, and the rar-
ity of sneezing/coughing in ferrets, result in poor trans-
missibility of the virus. This study predicts that person-
to-person transmission will readily occur if H5N1
acquires the ability to replicate in the URT and is read-
ily aerosolized or expelled in droplets.
Methods
Viruses
H5N1 strains A/Vietnam/1203/2004 and A/Mongolia/
244/2005 were from archives of the Southeast Poultry
Research Laboratory, and A/Iraq/207-NAMRU3/2006
was from the National Biodefense Analysis and Coun-
termeasures Center (NBACC), which obtained the virus
from Naval Medical Research Unit No. 3 (NAMRU-3),
Cairo, Egypt [39] (Table 1). The viruses were received as
low-passage stocks, and their identity verified using viral
genomic sequencing. Ferrets were pre-screened and
were shown to be negative for antibodies to circulating
seasonal influenza viruses A/Solomon Islands/3/2006
(H1N1), A/Wisconsin/67/2005 (H3N2), and B/Malaysia/
2506/2004 (all from Alexander Klimov, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention).
In-vitro cell growth and manipulations
As the infectivity of the viruses in this work was higher
in a Mustela vison (mink) lung (Mv1 Lu) cell line (vali-
dated at the Midwest Research Institute) than in the
more commonly used Madin Darby canine kidney
(MDCK) cell line used for influenza virus work (data to
be presented elsewhere), Mv1 Lu cells were used to
obtain viral titers. The Mv1 Lu cells were propagated in
Modified Eagle’s Medium with Earle’ss a l t s( E M E M )
supplemented with L-Alanyl-L-Glutamine (GlutaMAX™,
Invitrogen Corp., Carlsbad, CA), antibiotics [PSN; peni-
cillin, streptomycin, neomycin (Invitrogen Corp.)], pyru-
vate (Invitrogen Corp.), non-essential amino acids
(Invitrogen Corp.), and 10% (v/v) gamma-irradiated fetal
bovine serum (HyClone, Pittsburgh, PA). The cells were
negative by PCR for the presence of mycoplasma DNA
using a Takara PCR Mycoplasma Detection kit (Takara
Bio, USA, Thermo Fisher). Influenza viruses were grown
in Mv1 Lu cells in serum-free EMEM otherwise supple-
mented as previously described plus L-1-tosylamido-2-
phenylethyl chloromethyl ketone (TPCK)-treated myco-
plasma- and extraneous virus-free trypsin (Worthington
Biochemical Company, Lakewood, NJ) in 5% CO2 at
37°C (H5N1) or 35°C (seasonal viruses). The TPCK-
trypsin used for this work had higher specific activity
than TPCK-trypsin acquired elsewhere and therefore
used at a final concentration 0.1 μg/ml. Virus prepara-
tions were harvested when cytopathic effects (CPE) typi-
cal for influenza viruses were ≥ 80% [40]. The 50%
tissue culture infectious dose (TCID50) were calculated
by the Reed-Muench method [41].
Virus propagation in embryonating chicken eggs
Virus was propagated in the allantoic cavity of 9 to 11
day-old SPF chicken anemia virus (CAV)-free embryo-
nating chicken eggs (ECE) (CRL) [40,42,43].
Rapid detection of virus in tissue-culture supernatants
and allantoic fluids
As needed, a commercial solid phase ELISA test (Quick-
Vue Influenza A and B kit, Quidel Corp., San Diego,
CA) was used for rapid detection of influenza A or B
viruses following the manufacturer’s instructions.
Ferrets and their Pre-qualification for Studies
Studies were performed using descented, spayed
3-month-old female ferrets (0.5 - 0.9 kg) (Triple F
F a r m s ,S a y r e ,P A )t h a tw e r eh o u s e di n d i v i d u a l l yi n
HEPA-filtered (inlet and exhaust) ventilated individual
cages (Allentown, Inc., Allentown, NJ). The animals
lacked signs of epizootic catarrhal enteritis, and were
negative by microscopy for enteric protozoans such as
Eimeria and Isospora species using fecasol, a sodium
nitrate fecal flotation solution (EVSCO Pharmaceuticals,
B u e n a ,N J ) .T h ef e r r e t sw e r es e r o n e g a t i v eb yah e m a g -
glutination inhibition (HAI) assay [43] to circulating
influenza B viruses and H1N1, H3N2, and the H5N1
influenza A viruses. Priort op e r f o r m a n c eo ft h eH A I
assay, the ferret sera were treated overnight with recep-
tor destroying enzyme (RDE) (Denka Seiken USA, Inc.,
Campbell, CA) at 37°C to inactivate non-specific HAI
activity, then heated at 56°C for 60 minutes to inactivate
remaining RDE activity and complement proteins.
Room conditions for all work included 12 hr. light
cycles, and an average relative humidity at 30% within a
room temperature range between 64°and 84°F (17.8°to
28.9°C). The animals were fed pelleted ferret food
(Triple F Farms) and watered ad libitum, and housed
and maintained under applicable laws and guidelines
such as the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory
Animals (Institute of Laboratory Animal Resources,
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cil, National Academic Press, 1996) and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture through the Animal Welfare Act
(Public Law 89-544 and Subsequent Amendments), and
with appropriate approvals from the Midwest Research
Institute Animal Care and Use Committee. Body tem-
peratures were measured twice daily via subcutaneously
implantable programmable temperature transponders
(model IPTT-300, Bio Medic Data Systems, Seaford,
DE) implanted in the neck.
Intranasal inoculation studies
Procedures based on those of Zitzow et al.[ 2 2 ]w e r e
used. Briefly, twelve ferrets were used for each virus
study: nine (n = 9) for virus infection, three (n = 3) for
non-infected controls. Ferrets were anesthesized by
intramuscular administration of ketamine HCl (25 mg/
kg)-xylazine (2 mg/kg)-atropine (0.05 mg/kg), and
instilled with selected doses of viruses in isotonic phos-
phate buffered saline (PBS) with 0.5 % purified bovine
serum albumin (to stabilize the viruses) and antibiotics.
Fifty μl of virus suspension was instilled into each nos-
tril (100 μl of virus suspension/ferret). Two ferrets each
were inoculated IN with 10
4,1 0
3 and 10
2 TCID50,a n d
three ferrets each with 10
1 TCID50 of virus (TCID50
values determined in Mv1 Lu). A back-titration was per-
formed on the virus doses to verify viral titers per dose.
Three animals served as controls and received IN doses
of a 1:30 dilution of sterile, non-inoculated chicken
allantoic fluid in PBS. All the animals were caged indivi-
dually and weighed once daily for the duration of the
study. Body temperatures were recorded twice daily
from conscious animals that were stimulated and active
for at least five minutes (as there is a relatively large var-
iance in the resting and active temperatures of ferrets).
A temperature increase ≥1.4°C over baseline was consid-
ered significant; the baseline was the average tempera-
ture for the entire group over the pre-dose observation
period.
Nasal washes and rectal swab specimens were col-
lected at 3 and 5 days post-inoculation with virus. Clini-
cal signs including sneezing (before anesthesia),
inappetence, dyspnea, and level of activity were assessed
daily for the duration of the study (8 - 10 days). Inappe-
tence was judged through visual observation of the food
remaining in the feeder and spilled within the surround-
ing area. A scoring system (relative inactivity index
[RII]) based on that described by Reuman et al. [44]
a n da su s e db yG o v o r k o v aet al. [19] and Zitzow et al.
[22] was used to assess the activity level as follows: 0,
alert and playful; 1, alert but playful only when stimu-
lated; 2, alert but not playful when stimulated; and 3,
neither alert nor playful when stimulated. They were
also monitored daily for nasal and ocular discharge,
neurological dysfunction, and semi-solid or liquid stools.
Neurologic dysfunction was defined as development of
motor dysfunction (including paralysis or posterior
paresis), convulsions, ataxia, seizures, and depression.
Ferrets with > 25% loss of body weight or with neurolo-
gic dysfunction were anesthetized by intramuscular
administration of ketamine HCl (25 mg/kg)-xylazine
(2 mg/kg)-atropine (0.05 mg/kg), then euthanized with
Beuthanasia-D Special (sodium pentobarbital and
phenytoin sodium) or equivalent (Euthasol) via the
jugular vein.
Collection of nasal washes and virus titration
Nasal washes were collected at the same time as rectal
swab specimens (one collection of each/day) after anaes-
thesia with ketamine (25 mg/kg) essentially as described
by Zitzow et al. [22]. Briefly, 500 μl sterile isotonic PBS
containing 1% bovine serum albumin, and penicillin
(100 U/ml), streptomycin (100 μg/ml) and gentamicin
(50 μg/ml) was administered (250 μl/nostril) to induce
sneezes in ketamine-anaesthesized ferrets on days 3 and
5 post-inoculation with virus. Sneezes were collected in
a Petri dish, and diluted to 1 ml with cold PBS contain-
ing antibiotics. A 100 μl aliquot of the diluted material
was inoculated into a T25 flask containing Mv1 Lu cells
and incubated to screen for the presence of H5N1 virus,
and the remainder stored at -80°C. Samples positive for
H5N1 viruses by the screen were then titrated for five
days in Mv1 Lu cells in 96-well microtiter plates.
Collection of rectal swab specimens and virus detection
Rectal swab specimens were collected at the same time
as nasal washes (one collection of each/day) after anaes-
thesia with ketamine (25 mg/kg) [22]. Flocked nylon
swabs paired with Universal Transport Medium (UTM)
(both from Copan Diagnostics, Inc., Murrieta, CA) were
used to collect and transport anal swab specimens. The
swabs were pre-moistened with sterile PBS prior to spe-
cimen collection from sedated animals, inserted approxi-
mately 0.5 inches (~1.3 cm) into the rectum, retracted,
then swirled in 1 ml of UTM in the transport tube. The
transport tubes were vortexed for 1 minute to emulsify
the fecal material in UTM. The emulsified material was
diluted 1:10 in serum-free complete EMEM with trypsin,
5× PSN and Fungizone (amphotericin B) (Invitrogen),
and 0.5% w/v purified BSA fraction V, and left at room
temperature for 1 hr to allow the fecal solids to settle
and the antibiotics to suppress bacteria and fungi. The
liquid above the settled solids (nearly 10 ml) was then
added to Mv1 Lu cells in T75 flasks and incubated for
1 hr at 37°C. Thereafter, 15 ml of serum-free media
containing trypsin was added. Due to specimen variabil-
ity inherent with the procedure, no attempts were made
to quantitate the virus in the rectal swab specimens;
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work (performed by us) indicated the titer of VN/04
was > > MO/05 in rectal swab specimens.
Collection and virus titration of organs
Selected organs were collected for virus titration from
animals that were humanely euthanized after exhibiting
neurologic signs or at the time of the animal’sd e a t h .
Pooled organ tissue samples were collected from each of
the six lobes present in ferret lungs, from all parts of
the brain, and from the liver. All tissues were snap-fro-
zen on dry ice upon collection and stored at -80°C until
they were assayed for virus content/quantity. Tissue
samples were weighed and ~0.5 g homogenized in ster-
ile PBS with antibiotics and 0.5% w/v purified BSA
fraction V to form a 10% w/v homogenized suspension.
The homogenates were titrated for five days in Mv1 Lu
cells in serum-free media with trypsin to determine the
log10 TCID50 per gram of tissue. The lower detection
limit was estimated at 10
1.3 TCID50/gr tissue.
Exposure system and generation of aerosols
A nose-only bioaerosol inhalation exposure system
(NBIES) assembled in a Class III IsoGARD® Glovebox
( T h eB a k e rC o m p a n y ,S a n f o r d ,M E )i na nA B S L 3 +
laboratory was used for this work [36] (Figure 1).
A nose-only system was chosen for this study over
whole-body and other exposure routes because: (a) it
minimizes infection by non-inhalation routes, (b)
reduces requirements for post-exposure decontamina-
tion of animals (such as by wiping exterior of conscious
animal with bleach), (c) minimizes potential contamina-
tion of animal housing areas, (d) lessens contamination
risks for animal care personnel, and (e) permits testing
at high virus concentrations while minimizing quantities
of starting material. The latter consideration is impor-
tant for cradle to grave work with select agents, wherein
experiments are preferentially designed to utilize small
amounts of agent.
Ferret restraint tubes with push rods (prototypes built
for this work by CH Technologies, USA, Westwood, NJ)
( F i g u r e2 )w e r eu s e da l o n gw i t ham o d e l3 3 1 4A e r o d y -
namic Particle Sizer® (APS) Spectrometer (TSI Inc. St.
Paul, MN). The APS is used to measure the aerosol size
distribution in the test atmosphere and is operated with
Aerosol Instrument Manager software, release version
8.0.0.0 (TSI, Inc.) run in a Dell Latitude D600 computer.
A 3-jet BioAerosol Nebulizing Generator (BANG), (BGI
Inc., Waltham, MA) was used (CH Technologies). The
BANG is a low flow, low dead space nebulizer designed
to operate in the range of 1 to 4 liters per minute with
a pumped fluid (recirculated) flow that features minimal
sample utilization. It was chosen over other nebulizers
as the most appropriate generation device for the
aerosolization of influenza virus; considerations
included: minimal potential damage to agent, reduced
clumping of virus, uniformity of droplet size distribu-
tion, and efficiency (the amount of virus that needs to
be prepared is much smaller than that required by simi-
lar aerosol generators).
The exposure system contains sampling ports that are
tapped for: (a) measurement of aerosol particle size, and
(b), sample collection to assess live-agent aerosol con-
centration. Up to three animals were exposed per
e x p e r i m e n t[ 3 6 ] .A ne x p o s u r et i m eo f1 0m i n u t e sw a s
used [36]. Total flow through the inhalation system was
5 liters per min during the exposures created by the
BANG. The metrics for using the BANG generation
devices in association with the inhalation system was
previously described [36]. Exposure concentration
expressed in TCID50/ml was determined by sampling of
the aerosol stream using two model 7531 midget impin-
gers (AGI; Ace Glass Incorporated, Vineland, NJ) con-
nected in series.
The dynamic air flow through the aerosol delivery
ports on the system exceeds 3× the total ventilation
volume of all animals exposed. Influenza virus is mixed
with a non-toxic vehicle (sterile PBS solution with 0.5%
purified BSA fraction V) to help maintain viability of the
virus and act as a vehicle to generate the test aerosol.
The saline solution is well characterized and its acute
inhalation toxicity known; it does not cause an acute
inflammatory response or stimulate excess mucus secre-
tion leading to increased mucociliary clearance. Thus,
the ferrets remain susceptible to challenge infection
when the saline solution is inhaled in the quantities
used in this work (J. Lednicky, unpublished). The expo-
sure system is operated dynamically at negative pressure.
Prior to live-agent work, the aerosol system was char-
acterized to assess individual parameters, including
exposure port to port aerosol homogeneity, aerosol con-
centration ramp up, concentration stability and decline,
sample measurement, exposure location to exposure
location variation, and sampling system collection effi-
ciencies [36].
Calculations for aerosol transmission studies
The presented dose D ( d e f i n e da st h ei n h a l e dd o s ee s t i -
mated from the multiplication of the aerosol concentra-
tion and the total volume of air breathed in by the
animal) is estimated from the ferret respiratory rate and
duration of aerosol exposure. By convention used in
aerobiology, ( ) () ()() tR t C t f t d t exp
exp
= ∫0
,w h e r eR refers to
respiration rate, C refers to the concentration of aeroso-
lized agent, f(t) = % of agent deposited in the lungs, and
texp = exposure duration time. When the following
assumptions are made: a constant minute volume (Vm)
for R(t), a constant live-agent aerosol concentration
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(t), 100% deposition for f(t),a n dt(exp) is fixed at the
time of exposure, then: D=R×C×t exp.
The ferret respiratory minute volume (Vm), defined as
the volume of air inhaled or exhaled over a minute, was
estimated using Guyton’s formula [45], where BW =
body weight in gr, and the volume calculated in ml:
VB W B W m =× =× 21 0 21 0
34 07 5 ..
/.
Ferrets in this work ranged from about 500 to 900 gr.
For a 500 gr ferret, log10BW
3/4 = 0.75 × log10500 = 2.02.
The antilog of 2.02 = 105.7; therefore, Vm =2 . 1 0×
105.7 = 222.0 ml/min (0.22 L/min). Similarly, for a 900
gr ferret, Vm = 345.1 ml/min.
Since most of the ferrets were close to 500 gr, an
approximate Vm value of 0.2 L/min was used for this
work. The Vm v a l u eo f0 . 2L / m i nu s e di nt h i sw o r kw a s
consistent with estimates obtained by multiplying the
ferret tidal volume (Vt) expressed in ml × the breathing
rate (BR) of conscious ferrets expressed as breaths/min-
ute (bpm). By definition, Vt = the volume of air inspired
or expired with each normal breath, whereas BR = num-
ber of breaths/minute (bpm) for a conscious ferret. For
ferrets, Vt =6 . 0 6±0 . 3 0m l ,a n dB R=3 3-3 6b p m
[46,47].
VV B R mt =×
Using an average Vt value of 6.06 ml and an average
BR of 34.5 bpm, Vm = 209.01 ml/min = 0.21 L/min.
Precision in calculations of aerosol concentrations and
estimates of the number of viruses inhaled per experi-
ment depend largely on the collection efficiency/efficacy
of the impinger(s). Therefore, the impinger system must
first be characterized to establish operational parameters
determined to obtain the required D. Systems similar to
ours are often designed with a single impinger and are
operated with the assumption that > 90% of the aeroso-
lized microorganisms are entrained during sampling of
the aerosol flow through the impinger. If the true effi-
ciency is < 90%, a significant undercount of the aerosol
concentration can result, and this causes both an under-
estimate of the inhaled dose and an overestimate of
v i r u l e n c e( s i n c et h en u m b e ro fo r g a n i s m st oc a u s ea n
infection is undercounted). Moreover, the collection
fluid in the impinger must maintain the aerosolized
agent in a viable (infectious) manner and quantification
should be for viable agent. Otherwise, quantification of
aerosolized agent based solely on biochemical or immu-
nological assays (such as PCR or ELISA) may confound
understanding by measuring both live and inactivated
agents. The NBIES was designed with a dual impinger
arrangement based on our previous experience:
aerosolized VN/04 is not collected with high efficiency
with one impinger alone under the conditions we used,
whereas some seasonal influenza viruses can be (data
not shown). The collection fluid (PBS + 0.5% w/v puri-
fied BSA fraction V) was validated for this work (data
not shown). The lengthy steps and procedures to deter-
mine impinger collection efficiency will be presented
elsewhere. After establishing conditions resulting in >
90% collection of live agent at the impingers, calcula-
tions based on (theoretical) 100% efficacy of aerosol dis-
semination are derived to set operating parameters:
(1) Assuming 100% efficiency, the quantity of aero-
solized virus particles (VP) for a given Cs is calcu-
lated as:
VP =× × CQ t s mist exp
(2) The conc. of virus in impinger A is determined
for a given Cs
(3) The conc. of virus in impinger B is determined
for the same Cs in step 2
(4) The volume sampled by both impingers (Vi)i s
calculated for texp (for this work, 1 L/min × 10 min
=1 0L )
(5) Assuming even dissemination by the system, the
apparent concentration of virus (Capp) in the aerosol
stream is calculated as:
CV app i =+ sum of virus recovered in impingers  A B () /
(6) The volume disseminated by the system (Vs)i s
calculated as:
Vt se x p =× System flow rate
(7) At 100% efficiency, the concentration of VP in
the aerosol stream (Caero) is: VP/Vs
(8) The true efficiency (expressed as %) of the sys-
tem is: Capp/Caero × 100
(9) D = Capp × Vm × texp
Once the above are established, calculations typically
used in aerobiology can be made. The concentration of
virus in the aerosol stream, calculated from the virus
collected in impingers 1 and 2, where Qagi1+2 is the col-
lection flow rate in L/min through impingers (agi) 1 and
2, is:
C
CVagi CVagi
Qagi texp
aero =
×+ ×
+ ×
[( ) ( ) ] 12
12
The spray factor (SF), defined as the ratio of aerosol
concentration to starting concentration, is a unitless
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starting solution. A SF is calculated for a range of start-
ing concentrations using the same nebulizer and flows
designed for the aerosol challenge; as:
SF
Caero
Cneb
=
where Cneb = concentration of starting solution in the
BANG reservoir. An average spray factor SFavg is then
determined from a range of virus concentrations. The
predicted respiratory volume during exposure (Ve)i s
calculated as:
VV t em e x p =× duration of exposure ( )
The aerosol concentration (Caero) needed to attain D
is calculated as: VeCaero =D
The starting concentration Cs is then calculated from
the value calculated for SFavg as:
SF
Caero
Cs
avg =
The system displacement volume, Vtot,w h i c hi st h e
volume of aerosolized material leaving the nebulizer/
unit time, was approximated using the formula below,
where d refers to inner diameter of the tube/cylinder
and l is the length:
Vtot
d
l i
i i
=∑ Π
2
4
T h ev e l o c i t yo fa i ra tt h ea n i m a l s ’ nose (the exposure
port aerosol flow velocity) was calculated as:
Exposureport aerosol flow velocity
Qport
A
=
Finally, the number of system (total) air changes was
calculated as:
Air changes
Qsys
Vtot
=
Aerosol exposure studies
Virus was diluted to the appropriate concentration in
aerosol vehicle (PBS + 0.5% BSA fraction V), to which
was added antifoam 0.25% (v/v) molecular-grade anti-
foam agent B (Sigma-Aldrich, Inc., St. Louis, MO). After
mixing, 4 ml of virus + antifoam was placed in the
reservoir. Similarly, 10 ml of PBS + 0.5% BSA fraction V
b u tw i t h0 . 5 . %( v / v )a n t i f o a ma g e n tBw a sp l a c e di n t o
each impinger. Conscious ferrets were used for inhala-
tion studies. As for the intranasal inoculation studies,
ferrets were exposed to aerosolized viruses to attain
delivered doses of 10
1,1 0
2,1 0
3,o r1 0
4 infectious virus
particles over a 10 minute exposure period. All work
was performed expeditiously to minimize stress; animals
were moved in and out of the ferret restraint tubes rela-
tively quickly. Just prior to exposure, the animals were
loaded into ferret restraint tubes and quickly trans-
ported to the Class III glovebox housing the NBIES.
The tubes were affixed onto designated inhalation ports,
the aerosol generated, and the animals exposed accord-
ing to experimental design.
Upon completion, the tubes were disengaged and
placed in a transport bucket. The bucket was sealed, its
outsides decontaminated, removed from the glovebox,
and transported within the ABSL-3 suite to an animal
room, where the tubes were removed within a BSC. The
ferrets were then removed from the tubes and placed in
cages (1 animal/cage) within the BSC, and the cages
thereafter stacked in racks. Following aerosol exposure,
cage-side observations including evaluation of mortality,
moribundity, general health and morbidity were per-
formed once daily during the pre-clinical stage and
twice daily (at approximately 8-hour intervals) after
symptoms of influenza had developed. Weight and tem-
perature were determined once daily.
Necropsy
All procedures were performed in an ABSL3+ labora-
tory. For scheduled necropsies, animals were anesthe-
tized then humanely euthanized as described above by
trained technicians. After confirming death, the animals
were prosected within a Class II A2 BSC. Following
gross evaluation, tissues and organs were collected in
this order spleen, kidneys, intestines, liver, heart, lungs,
brain. To reduce hazards, a rotary saw was not used to
excise the whole brains from skulls. Instead, Dean bone
side-cutting forceps were used (Robosz Surgical Instru-
ments Company, Gaithersburg, MD), and the skull cut
from back to front along the medial suture lines using
long (> 5 mm) cutting strokes. Noteworthy, fragmenta-
tion and production of airborne bone chips were com-
mon when other cutting tools were used, especially with
short (< 2 mm) cutting strokes.
Histology analysis
Organs and tissues (brain, lungs, liver, spleen, heart, kid-
ney) were collected, sliced to ≤ 5 mm in thickness, fixed
in 10% neutral buffered formalin for 10 days to preserve
the tissues and inactivate the H5N1 viruses, then
embedded in paraffin for subsequent histology and
immunochemistry examinations. Formalin-fixed and
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hematoxylin and eosin for histological evaluation, and
adjacent sections analyzed by immunohistochemistry
with a primary antibody that recognized the influenza A
nucleoprotein of H5N1 viruses as previously described
[48].
Bio-containment facilities
In-vitro and in vivo experiments with H5N1 viruses
were conducted in USDA-approved biosafety level 3-
enhanced (BSL3+) and animal biosafety level 3-
enhanced (ABSL3 +) containment facilities, respectively,
and required use of personal protective equipment and
occupational health monitoring program.
Reverse transcription-PCR and virus sequencing
Viral RNAs were isolated from allantoic fluid or cell cul-
ture supernatant (QIAamp Viral RNA kit; QIAGEN)
and two-step reverse transcription-PCR was done with
synthetic universal and other oligonucleotide primers
[43,49]. The sequences were analyzed using an Applied
Biosystem 3130 DNA analyzer by using BigDye Termi-
nator (v. 3.1) chemistry and the same oligonucleotide
primers used for amplifications.
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